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Abstract: A systematic typology or comparative analysis of European historical regions does not 
exist and there is relatively little literature on the topic. The argument in this paper is that a six-fold 
classification is needed to capture the diversity of Europe’s historical regions and that these should 
be seen in terms of different routes to modernity and have broad civilizational backgrounds in 
common. The forms of modernity that constitute Europe as a world historical region correspond 
to North Western Europe, Mediterranean Europe, Central Europe, East Central Europe, South 
Eastern Europe, North Eastern Europe. 
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Introduction
The topic of this paper concerns the problem of conceptualizing the plural nature of 
Europe.1 The civilizational background has itself been diverse with routes within it that were 
shaped by the western and eastern currents of Roman civilization, the Russian offspring of 
the Byzantine tradition that developed in the east, and the multifarious impact of Islam on 
the Iberian and the South Eastern regions. Four inter-linked civilizational currents formed, 
what I have elsewhere termed, the European inter-civilizational constellation: the Gre-
co-Roman, the Western Christian, the Byzantine-Russian and Ottoman-Islamic traditions 
[Delanty 2002].2 The unity and diversity of Europe derives from its civilizational diversity, 
which also established the basis of different traditions of empire. However, this does not 
offer a sufficient basis for an assessment of the unity and diversity of Europe, for with the 
unfolding of the project of modernity new dynamics came into play bringing about a more 
complicated tapestry that cannot be so easily accounted for in terms of civilizational forms 
alone. Modernity brought about a major transformation in the moral and political hori-
zons of European societies. It placed the individual on a new level and put forward new 
ideas about political community that gave to the modern world a cultural model that both 
united and divided it, for the new ideas were not only differently interpreted in terms of 
their application, but were also differently formulated. Yet, certain trends unfolded that can 
be said to constitute the basic matrix of a European societal model; moreover, the ideas of 
modernity, including the idea of Europe, gave to European an imaginary that defined its 
*  Prof. Gerard Delanty. Department of Sociology, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9SN, UK. E-mail:   
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1  The paper is based on Chapter 10 of my forthcoming book Formations of European Modernity: A Historical 
and Political Sociology of Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).
2  Arguably a case could be made for the inclusion of Judaism as a separate civilization (in Eisenstadt’s terms: 
a diasporic civilization).
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identity. As with the civilizational background, modernity, too, crystallized into different 
forms and were taken up in different regional routes. The objective of this paper is to exam-
ine the regional diversity of Europe as a product both of civilizational backgrounds and 
the trajectories of modernity. This will entail in part a forward perspective to the twentieth 
century, since the shape of these routes was altered in the course of that century with the 
rise and fall of the Soviet Union and the creation and expansion of the European Union. 
However for reasons of space this cannot be explored in the present paper.
The notion of modernity offers a useful way to view the diversity of Europe since it 
includes a perspective on both unity and diversity. Modernity is based on a cultural model 
that provides a general framework of ideas and a cultural orientation; it is also based on 
a societal model, which can be seen in terms of relations between state, economy and civil 
society. A feature of European modernity in general was the fact that civil society remained 
relatively strong. The state was constantly challenged by organized social interests, which 
often became incorporated into the sphere of the state domesticating both the state and 
civil society and both exerted a strong influence over the market so that capitalism was 
constantly held in check by the state. In this view, the varieties of modernity that developed 
in Europe can be in part understood in terms of the different ways this societal model 
crystallized in the different historical regions of Europe. The notion of a historical region, 
despite the problems of definition, offers a fruitful approach to the analysis of the idea of 
Europe and an alternative to purely national histories.
A broad definition of Europe’s historical regions would identify three, namely western, 
central and eastern Europe, to follow Jeno Szücs [1988] classification in his famous essay 
“The Three Historical Regions of Europe” in which he argued for three historical regions: 
Western, East Central and Eastern Europe. In an earlier classic work Oskar Halecki [1950] 
identified four historical regions: western, west-central, east central and eastern. However, 
a more differentiated and systematic approach is needed given the especially complicated 
nature of Central Europe and the post 1989 context that led to a major reconfiguration of 
central and eastern Europe and the system of states established in 1919. A systematic typol-
ogy or comparative analysis does not exist and there is relatively little literature on the topic 
[see Arnason and Doyle 2010]. The proposal in this paper is that a six-fold classification 
is needed to capture the diversity of routes to modernity without reducing all such routes 
and models of modernity to national trajectories or collapsing them into more general civ-
ilizational categories. The forms of modernity that constitute Europe as a world historical 
region correspond to North Western Europe, Mediterranean Europe, Central Europe, East 
Central Europe, South Eastern Europe, North Eastern Europe. 
As with all such classifications there is the problem of defining specificity and taking 
into account overlap as well as broader contexts of commonality. Furthermore there is the 
complication that historical regions do not remain constant with the result that different 
configurations may be relevant in different periods. The map of Europe’s regions will have 
been very different from the standpoint of the tenth century or the seventeenth century. 
However for the purpose of the present analysis assumptions will be made about the longue 
durée from the perspective of the present. An additional problem is the degree to which 
self-identification should be taken into account. In the case of historical regions self-identi-
fication can be regarded as less important than in defining national identity, not least since 
regional identity is not the most important feature of a historical region whose specificity 
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may be the basis of different but related identities. To add a further level of complication, 
many regions are the product of ideological constructions – for example the notion of Mit-
teleuropa, or Eastern Europe or the notion of the Balkans – and can be hegemonic in the 
ways in which they establish taken for granted relations between peripheries and centres. 
The more general categories of western, central and eastern, or a dichotomy of West and 
East also do not offer a sufficiently rich basis on which to explore the variety of models of 
modernity in Europe. 
The case for the specificity of these regions will be made below in more detail. A notion 
of historical region implies that there is a common historical experience that can be dis-
cerned in the longue durée and that common features of the region’s history are more 
significant than the differences [Müller 2010: 114]. The general rationale in this paper for 
a differentiated approach to Europe’s historical regions is, firstly, that each must corre-
spond to a distinctive route to modernity which is a variant of the more general form that 
European modernity took; secondly, there should be a broad background in civilizational 
contexts. Together civilizational backgrounds and routes to modernity define the identity 
of a historical region and give to it a certain unity which in turn is the basis of a “mental 
map”. In short, it is necessary to define the regions as transnational historical spaces in 
terms of their relation to Europe – as variants of a more general historical space – and 
in terms of their specificity in relation to each other as areas of close interaction and his-
torical commonality.
A final preliminary observation is that all these historical regions are not self-enclosed 
enclaves, but overlapping and in many cases their historical experience entailed at different 
points a shared history, as in the case of those areas that fell under Soviet rule in the post 
1945 period. For these reasons, Europe’s historical regions might be seen as borderlands. 
The borders that have shaped the historical regions of Europe changed so many times that 
they are best seen less as lines of division than as lines that constitute intersecting spaces. 
For Balibar [2004]. Europe is itself a borderland in that it is made up of multiple spatiali-
ties in terms of state formation, markets, social and cultural institutions and identities. In 
this view, any reference to a geopolitical or historical region must recognise its intercon-
nections with other regions. Europe’s regions should thus be seen in terms of hyphenated 
spatialities than as separated territories. The following discussion of Europe’s six major 
historical regions will consider the interconnected nature of these regions as much as their 
singularity.
North Western Europe
The very notion of a North Western Europe is itself an acknowledgement of a border-
land. Rather than speak of western Europe in general, it is more meaningful to take the 
more circumscribed category of North Western Europe. This includes the British Isles, 
Scandinavia3, France, the Low Countries and Germany. As a borderland, the inclusion of 
Germany ties the area to Central Europe, given the overlapping nature of Germany, which 
3  There may be an argument for Scandinavia to be considered part of a distinct Nordic region. For present 
purposes, given the model of modernity that evolved there it is considered part of the wider North Western 
region [see Arnason and Wittrock 2012].
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includes more than one historical region. The region may be extended to include northern 
Italy and parts of the Iberian Peninsula could arguably claim to be part of a wider notion of 
western Europe. However, the notion of North Western Europe puts the emphasis on the 
northernness of the region and for this reason it is best seen in more limited terms as an 
area that can be located within the broader category of western Europe, but which exhibits 
distinctively northern features.
North Western Europe has been influenced both by Central Europe in general and 
more specifically by Mediterranean Europe. In earlier periods, Southern Europe provided 
the basic civilizational orientations for all of Europe and North Western Europe bears 
this influence. However, in the course of history the western area of Europe became pro-
gressively distinct from Southern Europe and its shared characteristic with the regions of 
Central and Eastern Europe too became less formative. The Frankish leadership under 
Charlemagne gave to the region its essential identity, which according to Henri Pirenne 
[2001] in his famous thesis first published in 1935 – “without Mohammed there would 
have been no Charlemagne” – was made possible by the rise and advancement of Islam 
across the southern shores of the Mediterranean. 
As we have seen, state formation since the nineteenth century tended to move in the 
direction of sea-based empires and with a relatively high degree of democratization in 
the metropole. With its historical basis in the Carolingian kingdom and the area west of the 
Rhine, the North West region became what has often been called modern or core Europe 
and formed the basis of what was eventually to become the European Union. However 
misleading the idea of a core Europe is and despite the many wars fought within the region 
between the dynastic powers and the later national states, North Western Europe exhibits 
remarkable similarity in its political, economic and wider societal structures and insti-
tutions. It has undeniably played a major role in the shaping of modern Europe both for 
good and for bad. The diversity of its regions in terms of cultural factors, such as language 
and national identity, disguises a certain unity that is discernable more in the myriad of 
interconnections than in a common framework. No such structure developed, at least until 
the formation of the EEC in 1958; yet, the region has had a relatively common history in 
terms of both its civilizational background and in its model of modernity. A crucial fact 
in its uniformity and overall dominance has been the fact that the region enjoyed relative 
uninterrupted growth and consolidation over several centuries, while the eastern regions 
underwent major changes in their civilizational directions. The Mongol invasions of Rus-
sia, the latter’s expansion over eastern and central Europe, and the Ottoman conquests of 
the South East, the German onslaught in the 1940s led to more turbulent histories.
The civilizational roots of North Western Europe were formed by Latin Christianity 
and in part by the Roman Empire. However much of the area lay outside the territory of 
the Roman Empire, which can be considered to have been less important than the state tra-
dition and the institutions that developed in the medieval age. A key aspect of this was the 
struggle between Church and State and the fact that in the balance that was finally achieved 
the state retained juridical autonomy and was not subordinated to ecclesiastical authority. 
The result was a clear separation of state and society. The states that formed in Northern 
Western Europe have been relatively settled in their basic structures and territories and 
the nation-states that consolidated there witnessed greater stability and continuity than in 
most other parts of Europe where the state tradition and nationhood led to less peaceful 
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outcomes. Earlier, feudalism established the conditions for economic and political stability 
as did its relatively early abolition. The “Great Transformation” that led to the emergence of 
the modern market society that Karl Polanyi [1944] characterized as the basis of modern 
society was most vividly present in North Western Europe where the industrial revolution 
and the formation of the modern class structure was also most advanced. In addition to 
these factors relating to the state formation and market society, North Western Europe had 
a long tradition of the autonomy of the city vis-à-vis the countryside. The rise of civil soci-
ety, decisive for the emergence of modernity, was possible only because of the autonomy 
of the city and the kinds of authority that it cultivated. Later patterns of democratization 
were built on these foundations. 
The societal model of modernity that developed in North Western Europe can thus 
be characterized as a relatively distinct one whose early crystallization has been import-
ant in the overall shaping of Europe. The Cold War and the rise of military and fascist 
regimes in southern Europe in the post-1945 period gave to it an additional identity 
based on democracy and capitalism. For instance, Spain, under Franco until 1975, was 
relatively isolated and experienced a different transition to the European social model in 
the twentieth century that clearly demarcates it from the experience of North Western 
Europe. In this region democratic capitalism enjoyed a period of uninterrupted growth 
since 1945 in contrast to Eastern and Southern Europe, where the democratic tradition 
was variously interrupted. Italy, at least until the 1980s, was the exception, but there the 
huge divide between north and south and the power of the Mafia in Italian politics, put it 
on a different trajectory from Northern Europe. North Western Europe contains the most 
powerful economies in Europe and in the world, the Germany, UK, France, the latter 
two having had the largest overseas empires. It can be finally noted that North Western 
Europe was western in another sense: it was part of the wider West world with its centre 
in the Atlantic rather than in the Mediterranean or Black Sea. Today, in the twentieth 
first century, this may have lost much of its force, but in the previous century it gave to 
the area an identity that consolidated an historical trajectory that might otherwise have 
had less specificity.
Mediterranean Europe
The notion of a Mediterranean Europe presents some obvious difficulties since it cov-
ers a wider and diverse area stretching from the Iberian peninsula, southern France, Italy, 
part of the southern Balkans and Greece. As with all of the historical regions of Europe 
it does not have clear cut boundaries and more or less all of its constitutive countries 
are not entirely Mediterranean in their entirety. Unlike the other historical regions it is 
more difficult to specify a historical core area, though arguably that core is Roman. The 
case of Greece is a complication, since its civilizational background and path to moderni-
ty is markedly different from the countries of the western Mediterranean. For this reason 
it is probably best located as part of South Western Europe. Another complicating case is 
Portugal, while not having a Mediterranean coast and more Atlanticist in orientation 
is nonetheless from its civilizational influences clearly not too far removed from the wider 
Iberian context. Despite these qualifications it is possible to speak of the specificity of 
a Mediterranean Europe as a historical region.
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This region is above all a civilizational one that was shaped by the Roman Empire and 
Catholicism. The Roman Empire provided the most enduring cultural and geopolitical 
framework for the emergence of Europe, but this was primarily a Mediterranean civiliza-
tion rather than a northern or western one. The cities founded by the Romans as well as the 
roadways they built gave to the region a matrix that laid the basis of a civilizational orien-
tation. However, the post-Roman empires were all greatly shaped by its legacy as were the 
national cultures and the modern nation states that emerged in the area. The Holy Roman 
Empire is one such legacy that for almost a thousand years from the tenth to the eighteenth 
century gave a certain unity to much of Europe. While this had a pronounced Habsburg 
dimension since the early sixteenth century, when it became known as the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation, it was modelled on the memory of Rome. The cultural 
heritage of the Roman empire is easily discernable along the shores of the Mediterranean 
in ways of life, language, religion, climate and the built environment. Greece, different in 
its language and religion from the largely Latin influenced western areas, is equally part 
of the Southern Eastern historical region; its state tradition is different from the western 
European one, as its model of church state relations, and the slow development of capital-
ism marks it off from the wider Mediterranean area. 
The Roman origins of Mediterranean Europe draw attention to the wider unity of the 
Mediterranean and the fact that the Roman Empire was not simply European but includ-
ed North Africa and parts of the middle east. The Roman Empire was itself shaped by 
Greek antiquity and by the numerous cultures it encountered. Entailed in this is the idea 
of a Euro-Arab region, for both the European and the Arab shores of the Mediterranean 
form part of the wider unity of the region. This was not only in the distant past. Much of 
the Maghreb was part of Europe in the twentieth century and several wars were played out 
in the area as a result of the imperialist ambitions of the European powers. Algeria was 
an integral part of France until after the war of independence in 1962; the circumstances 
that led to the Spanish civil war emerged from the loss of Spanish dominion in North 
Africa; fascist Italy sought to control Ethiopia. The notion of a Mediterranean Europe as 
a historical region is best understood as a borderland region formed out of cross-cultural 
encounters and the civilizational legacy of Rome. This borderland can be considered the 
basis of what Ian Chambers [2008] has termed a “heterogeneous modernity” which is 
a particularly striking feature of the area.
The examples of Malta and Cyprus capture the spirit of Mediterranean Europe as a bor-
derland and one deeply influenced by the Roman origins, as well as the later Byzantine 
Empire. The two islands had been for long part of the Muslim world. Malta’s chequered 
history was marked by various periods of conquest by the Normans, the Arabs, the Ger-
mans, Spanish, British and was the scene of numerous wars. Cyprus is an example of 
Greek, Greco-Roman, and Ottoman encounters and divisions. Today these islands are part 
of the EU and constitute the heart of the wider Euro-Mediterranean area, an identity that 
was revived in the 1990s with the enlargement of the EU.
The idea of a European Mediterranean took on a new form in 1995 with the Euro-Med-
iterranean partnership between the European Union and the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean, and revived in 2008 with the idea of the Union of the Mediterranean, 
which was created to promote economic integration and democratic reform across sixteen 
countries in Southern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East (these being Albania, 
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Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). The 
EU has been effective in giving shape to the European Mediterranean as a regional identity 
[Pace 2004; Featherstone and Kazamias 2001]. 
In terms of patterns of modernity that developed in the region, Mediterranean Europe, 
the historical models of modernity associated with France, Italy and Spain can all be con-
sidered to be firmly within the wider western Europe tradition, albeit with large variations 
and uneven development, such as the contrast between southern and northern Italy. The 
twentieth century fascist and military regimes in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece – and 
the civil wars within the latter two countries – are a reminder of a weaker state tradition 
and an interrupted transition to democracy. The case for the distinctiveness of a Med-
iterranean Europe is largely made on the basis of its civilizational influences. However, 
considered as a whole the pattern of modernity in terms of state formation, capitalism, and 
civil society bears the mark of the European societal model in so far as the democratizing 
influences of civil society are concerned. In all its areas the national state was established 
by the nineteenth century, a feature it shares with North Western Europe and a contrast to 
Central and Eastern Europe. For all these reasons the idea of a Mediterranean Europe can 
be regarded as a distinctive transnational historical region.
Central Europe
Of all of Europe’s historical regions, Central Europe is the one that comes closest to 
having a regional identity rooted both in civilizational currents and in a model of moderni-
ty.4 The idea of Mitteleuropa has a long resonance in the German speaking world. Although 
not an identity as such, it invokes a heritage that is distinct from both eastern and western 
Europe. Like the term Europe itself, it has always been a contested term and has had dif-
ferent uses depending on when and by whom it has been used. It had pan-German origins, 
but with the political instrumentalization of the pan-Germanism with the Nazis, it became 
most widely used as an Austrian nostalgic term for the Europe of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire. In the 1980s it acquired a more pronounced political meaning in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia as a way of defining the European heritage of those countries against the 
Soviet Union and communism. In this use of the term, as advanced by Milan Kundera 
and George Konrad, it signified civil society. As a historical region, Central Europe – as 
opposed to the idea of Mitteleuropa – includes southern Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
and much of what will be discussed separately as East Central Europe, namely Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia. The historical heart of the region is the area 
once covered by the Austro-Hungarian empire. Its centres were Vienna, Prague, Ljubljana, 
Trieste, Bratislava and Budapest and could be extended to parts of South Eastern Europe, 
certainly Zagreb. In this sense it is a poly-centric historical region.
The idea of Mitteleuropa has been the subject of several influential works that have con-
tributed to the regional identity of the region. The most well known are Friedrich Naumann’s 
Mitteleuropa in 1915, Thomas Masaryk’s The New Europe in 1918 and Claudio Magris’s 
Danube [2001]. The geographical and political notion of Mitteleuropa by definition can 
4  This section draws in part on Vidmar-Horvat and Delanty [2005]. 
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only be a relative term since its definition rests on assumptions on the borders of Europe. 
In the case of the eastern border, which has been the most important in the self-definition 
of Mitteleuropa, this has shifted numerous times. As Kundera [1984: 35] has written, “Its 
borders are imaginary and must be drawn and redrawn with each new historical situation”. 
Obviously, the notion is essentially cultural rather than geopolitical. 
The idea of Mitteleuropa had been part of German economic policy since Frederick 
List promoted it as an area of free trade, but it should not be equated with Prussian expan-
sionism. For Naumann Mitteleuropa referred to the larger German speaking lands as well 
as the non-German regions of the Habsburg empire, and was as much a political and cul-
tural category as it was economic; Thomas Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, 
in contrast, used the term to exclude German and Austria, essentially meaning the smaller 
countries of East Central Europe (see below). In this view, Mitteleuropa is not located 
between north and south and could include Greece and Finland. A related idea, influential 
in Germany in the inter-war years, was the notion of Zwischeneuropa, first coined by the 
geographer Albrecht Penck in the early twentieth century, and which can be translated 
as a borderland Europe, though literally meaning “in between” Europe, that is the “in 
between” areas between East and West. The term was revived in Austrian nationalism to 
connect the country to the Habsburg past. Any discussion of the notion of Mitteleuropa 
runs the risk of either polemics or simplification. Like Europe as a whole it lacks clear 
borders, suggesting it is more like a state of mind or a culture or fate, as Milan Kundera 
has argued, than a state or territory.
The notion of Mitteleuropa should not be dismissed as nostalgia for the Habsburg 
empire, Catholicism or as a German expansionist ideology, simply because it had too 
many meanings, which include a certain cultural cosmopolitanism. In a region where 
the nation-state developed later than in North Western Europe, there is some value in 
re-assessing it in light of the region’s multi-ethno-nationalism. In addition, there is the 
relevance of the wider appeal in the region for a supranational ideal. Without this the very 
possibility of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, as a union of states, or the Dual Monarchy of 
Austria and Hungary would not have been possible. These now vanished confederal states 
were a feature of the political landscape of Europe in the mid-twentieth century and their 
disappearance has not been without a certain loss of opportunity to a create multi-national 
state. It was this sense of the term that the Austro-Marxists sought an alternative to the 
nation-state in the aftermath of the first world, for they believed that the political structure 
of the Dual Monarchy could be used to construct a new post-imperial political framework.
The notion of Central Europe/Mitteleuropa had considerable appeal to civil society 
intellectuals (such as Michnik, Konrad, Havel) in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 
the 1980s. Kundera’s famous 1984 essay “The Tragedy of Central Europe”, although writ-
ten in exile, captured the mood of the period with his notion of a “return to Europe” and 
thus signalled an anti-communist appeal to the European traditions of the region. In the 
1989 discourse on Mitteleuropa Russia is the Other. It was a contrast, too, to the western 
triumphalist narrative of the “end of history” and instead called for the “re-birth of Europe”. 
In this use of the term, modernity as a societal condition is most evident, for by Europe 
is signalled the political assertion of the autonomy of civil society against the absolute 
state and the suppression of individual and collective liberty. Viewed in such terms, Mit-
teleuropa is not just a civilizational milieu, but reflects a model of modernity in which the 
2725HistorickaSociologie1_2011.indd   16 11.2.13   9:2917
conflict between civil society and the state has been central to its identity. It is possibly this 
post-socialist conception of Mitteleuropa that has the most relevance for the present day; 
it offers a way to re-address the question of the inter-cultural and multi-national legacy of 
a poly-centric region whose borders have continued to change.
East Central Europe
In recent years the notion of East Central Europe has emerged less as an alternative 
to the idea of Central Europe than a demarcation within it of a more narrowly defined 
region [see Arnason 2005a; Arnason and Doyle 2010; Troebst 2003]. Unlike the broader 
category of Central Europe it does not have the same resonance in terms of an identity and 
has been mostly used by historians of the region, such as Szücs [1988] and Halecki [1950, 
1953], who noted an inner dualism within Central Europe between its western and eastern 
orientations. Yet a case can be made for its relevance as a distinctive historical heritage. 
While Central Europe refers to a wider area that includes the German speaking world and 
much of the Habsburg territories, the notion of East Central Europe pertains specifically 
to Poland, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia. The notion should be extended to include 
Slovenia, which can also be regarded as part of Central Europe’s eastern face. However, the 
core has generally been taken to be Hungary, the Czech lands, and Poland. The notion of 
East Central Europe in many ways approximates to the non-Austro-German Mitteleuropa, 
and a contrast to what might be more accurately termed West Central Europe. As a region, 
it is located between the Baltic and the Adriatic, on the one side, and on the other between 
Russia to the East, the Ottoman Empire to the South East and the various incarnations of 
the German empires in West. For this reason, it accords most precisely with the idea of “the 
lands in between”. The region is thus to be distinguished from the Ottoman influenced 
South Eastern Europe and from North Eastern Europe, in the sense of the western Rus-
sian speaking world and the Baltic region (see below). Szücs, in his classic essay written in 
1981, argued it lay between two areas of expansion: the western zone of expansion and the 
Russian one to the East [Szücs 1988: 313].
In civilizational terms, East Central Europe is a product of western Christianity, but 
represents the interface of the Carolingian tradition with Slavic, Hungarian, and eastern 
influences. Its identity was shaped against the Ottomans to the South East and the Russians 
to the East. As Arnason [2005a: 392] has argued, its heritage is more intra-civilizational 
than inter-civilizational, since the dominant influences were variants of Western Christian-
ity. However, the inter-civilizational dimension is also present in view of the older conflict 
in the region between Western and Eastern Christianity before the final alignment with 
the western tradition in the ninth century. Before the formation of the Polish, Bohemian 
and Hungarian kingdoms, the area saw the emergence of the Christian principality of 
Moravia, destroyed by the Magyar invasion around 900, and later the other Czech king-
dom to the west, namely Bohemia. The three kingdoms that consolidated in the region 
and shaped its identity as a historical region were themselves expansionist. Of the three 
kingdoms, though all integrated into western Christianity, the Bohemian kingdom was 
more closely integrated into the western tradition, being part of, and for a time, home to 
the capital of the Holy Roman Empire. Due to the Hussite movement, it has a good claim 
to be seen as the beginning of the Reformation, and the conflict between the Hussites and 
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a Catholic Church attempting to reform itself prefigured the later battle between the Ref-
ormation and the Counter-Reformation. There is another sense in which the region can 
be considered to be an important area of inter-civilizational influences. In the three core 
areas, Bohemia, Poland and Hungary there has been for a long a large Jewish population 
that was fully integrated into the social, cultural and economic life of the societies. The 
Jewish dimension of the region, by far the most important in all of Europe, added to its 
multi-ethnic diversity. The loss of this after the Shoah represents a major cultural loss for 
the region and for Europe.
While Hungary and the Czech nation remained relatively intact in their borders over 
the centuries, the case of Poland is rather more complicated. Its borders have shifted many 
times in history and, as with much of central Europe, it has had a divided heritage between 
its eastern and western orientations. Of these it is undoubtedly the western pull that has 
been decisive and led to the creation by the Jagellonian dynasty of the Polish-Lithuanian 
kingdom in the sixteenth century. Stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, this was 
a powerful and large multi-national state that was created in 1385 when the Jagellonian 
dynasty came to the Polish crown, consolidated into a closer union in 1569 and lasted until 
its demise in 1795 following the partition of Poland. This episode is also an illustration 
of the involvement of the region in a wider borderland area. The Lithuanian link did not 
endure, though arguably a case could be made for the inclusion of Lithuania and the Baltic 
states in the category of East Central Europe. However, their different historical paths and 
later patterns of state formation and societal modernization put them on a trajectory dif-
ferent from that of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, a region that can be extended 
to include both Slovakia and Slovenia. 
An example of the civilizational current in the region, pan-Slavism was for a time 
a reflection of a transnational identity that tied the region to a broader trans-region. 
Although it did not endure, due not least to the diverse Slavic traditions, significant cultur-
al differences between the Russian and Polish Slavophiles, and the different routes that the 
Slavic peoples had embarked on, it illustrates a departure from the wider Central European 
region. The eastern versus the western faces of the regions were less strong in the Czech 
lands and in Hungary, while in Poland the search for a Slavic nativism based on a peasant 
culture ceased to be significant by the twentieth century and in all parts of the region 
a pronounced European consciousness was present and, especially in the Czech case, an 
integral part of its national identity.
From the perspective of modernity, the core countries of East Central Europe can all 
be seen as within the broader category of European modernity. Their historical experi-
ence has been marked by resistance to absolutism. In the early modern period, especially 
in the Poland and in Bohemia, but also in Hungary, there was considerable resistance to 
absolutism, in the case of Bohemia resistance to the Habsburgs and in the case of Poland 
to the Russian empire. Within their territories absolute rule was curbed by traditions of 
rights and privileges of the nobles that set limits to imperial power without representa-
tion and eventually provided the ground on which nationalism would rise. This has been 
described as a political culture of government by estates and differs from western monar-
chical and absolutist rule as well as from Muscovite autocracy and Ottoman centralized 
statehood [Müller 2010: 115]. This tradition gave to the region a political heritage that 
can be seen as basis of a democratic tradition, albeit a weak one. Unlike, other parts of 
2725HistorickaSociologie1_2011.indd   18 11.2.13   9:2919
what was once called Eastern Europe, such as Romania and Bulgaria, the area shared with 
the west a similar history based on feudalism and private ownership, though the tran-
sition to industrialization took place much later [Berend 2005: 402]. Western influences 
were stronger than in the areas further east, to the south in the Balkans and to the north 
where Russia exerted more influence. Despite these similarities, nation-state building 
since 1919 put the region on a different course from the mainstream North Western and 
Mediterranean regions, for in this region the problem of linguistic, ethnic and cultural 
plurality were very great and not easily accommodated into the mono-cultural design of 
the national state.
In the twentieth century, East Central Europe was massively transformed by the double 
impact of German fascism from the west and from the east by communism and Soviet 
occupation. This experience ensured that modernity would take a different form in the 
region, which also experienced an experiment with state formation. The creation in 1918 
of Czechoslovakia can be seen as a variant of modernity that eventually proved too fragile 
to last and the two nations finally separated in 1992 [Arnason 2005b]. Though it should be 
noted that in all of the Soviet bloc in central and eastern Europe, it was in the previously 
more European and western oriented Czechoslovakia that communism received consider-
able domestic support. Some of the most significant debates on the meaning of democracy 
and civil society took place in the countries of East Central Europe in the second half of 
the twentieth century [see Garton Ash 1993]. The assertion of civil society by dissident 
intellectuals against the totalitarian state has been a significant aspect of European political 
modernity that had a transformative impact in the region leading to the eventual collapse 
of Soviet domination. 
South Eastern Europe
As a historical region South Eastern Europe presents a number of difficulties of defi-
nition, being in part an extension of both Eastern and Central Europe. However, the 
specificity of the region marks it off from both in very distinctive ways. The region in ques-
tion concerns the Balkans including Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Greece and Romania. 
The latter two, especially Greece, are by no means self-evident. The case for the inclusion 
of Greece within the category of South Eastern Europe is made on the basis of its partic-
ipation in the Byzantine-Orthodox civilizational background, which has been arguably 
more significant for its history than its entry to the western world since its independence 
from the Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century. Moreover, in the course of that 
century Greek culture had a formative impact on the rest of the Balkans. As argued earlier, 
Greece can also be considered as part of Mediterranean Europe. However, in consider-
ation of the overall historical, civilizational and geopolitical context, Greece can be seen as 
part of South Eastern Europe, as can Romania. Since Romania was formed in 1859 out of 
the historical region of Moldova, along with Wallachia, the present state of Moldova can 
be located with the wider region of South Eastern Europe. As a historical region, South 
Eastern Europe while not being entirely reducible to the Balkans is unavoidably more or 
less synonymous with it, thus giving to the area a certain identity. 
From a civilizational perspective the region is defined by two orientations. Firstly, the 
Byzantine and Orthodox heritage has been an important civilizational influence. The entire 
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Balkan region differs from the other regions of Europe by the Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy, 
deriving from the Byzantine tradition, has also remained an enduring feature of Bulgaria 
and Romania [Blokker 2010]. The second civilizational influence is the Ottoman-Islamic 
heritage. Since the Ottoman conquests of the Bulgarian and Serbian kingdoms, the region 
underwent a very different history to that of the rest of Europe. Due to the nature of 
Ottoman rule, Islam was not imposed on the populations of the conquered countries, 
but Islamic influences were present and in many cases there were conversions to Islam, 
examples being Albania and Kosovo. More important than Islam was the wider Otto-
man influence in the region. In European historiography the area was once referred to as 
Turkey-in-Europe and was the object of much western, especially British, Prussian and 
Habsburg, foreign policy making in the nineteenth century [Müller 2001]. In addition to 
these factors, the Slavic component has been significant, uniting at least linguistically the 
Croats, Bosnians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. Yugosla-
via – meaning “the land of the Southern Slavs” – derived its name from this civilizational 
unity. The link between the Slavophile movement and orthodoxy adds an additional layer 
of weight to the civilizational specificity of the region and has often been regarded as 
a basis for anti-westernism. Many Bulgarians and Serbs, influenced more by Russian than 
Greek culture, saw Europe as a distinct cultural form different from the Byzantine legacy 
of Slavdom and Orthodoxy [Mishkova 2008: 245]. 
As a geopolitical and civilizational space South Eastern Europe can be seen for much 
of its history located between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. In the case of Bulgaria, 
the Russian influences were significant, although in this instance to be explained less by the 
direct impact of Russia than by appropriation by the Bulgarian intelligentsia of Russian 
culture in order to combat the dominance of Greek cultural superiority in the Balkan 
region [Mishkova 2008: 242]. In the second half of the twentieth century the area, along 
with much of central and southern Europe other than Greece, fell under Russian domi-
nation. The Russian and Ottoman moments, in particular the latter, shaped the region in 
ways that mark it off from the rest of Europe. These amount to a civilizational influence 
and attest to the presence within Europe of neighbouring civilizations, which give to the 
European heritage its character as a constellation of interacting civilizations.
Europe has been greatly shaped by the seas that surround it. This is especially true of 
South Eastern Europe. The Black Sea is as important, if not more, than the Mediterra-
nean and the Adriatic seas in the region. Its place and significance in European history 
has been neglected. The Balkan region is generally seen as a mountainous region – the 
name Balkan means mountains – and one that is cut off from the rest of Europe. Placing 
the Black Sea rather than landmasses at the centre of stage gives a rather different view 
of the region. As Neal Ascherson [1995] has argued in his travel history of the Black 
Sea, over many centuries the Black Sea united cities and regions in Greece, the Ukraine, 
Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. In this perspective the Black Sea is, like the Mediter-
ranean Sea, a zone of interconnections between Europe and its neighbouring regions. 
The Black Sea, which receives five rivers including the Danube and the Don, has been 
important in European history since antiquity. The Crimea was one of the most import-
ant centres of the trading networks in the Greek world and it was especially important 
for Classical Athens; it was the site of a major war in the nineteenth century and the 
location of the Yalta conference, which symbolically represented the post-war division 
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of Europe between East and West [Ascherson 1995: 10; Feher 1987]. Such a view of South 
Eastern of Europe would place it in relation to the Caucasus area, in particular linked 
to Georgia and Armenia. Instead of seeing the area as cut off, as in mainstream Euro-
centric accounts, it should be seen as constituting links between the different cities and 
regions drawn together by the Black Sea. In this view, William McNeill [1964] locates the 
region as part of a wider Danubian and Pontic European region and constituting what 
he termed Europe’s “Steppe Frontier”.
Any discussion of the modernity of the South Eastern of Europe is unavoidably 
complicated by the perceived view of backwardness with respect to western Europe and 
a representation of the region in terms of “Balkanism”, which Todorova [1997] regards as 
another kind of Orientalism. Representations of especially the Balkan area as the opposite 
to the West and as an extension of the Ottoman East have also been reflected in the ways 
the Balkans have also perceived themselves. Such positions operate on the basis of a dis-
tinction of core and periphery where by the periphery is always defined in relation to the 
modernity and high civilization of the core. This fails to capture the diversity of Europe 
and its multiple civilizational logics. By reducing the Balkan region to an extension of the 
Ottoman East, it also fails to understand how a different route to modernity is possible. 
This eurocentric tendency should not be exaggerated, for it would appear that it was more 
recent than previously thought [Mishkova 2008]. Larry Wolff [1994], for instance, claimed 
this hegemonic discourse was part of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, but it may 
have been a later nineteenth development. As Mishkova [Mishkova 2008: 251] has argued, 
while the “gaze of the Other” was always a feature of the Balkans, in reality there existed 
many gazes often in conflict with each other.
North Eastern Europe
Any account of the historical regions of Europe is complicated by the question of 
what constitutes Eastern Europe or the East of Europe today in light of the absence 
of any clear lines of demarcation. All such designations are relative – the northern tip of 
Norway is as geographically east as Istanbul – and generally based on the assumption 
that the core is the west. The Cold War division of Europe has left a lasting mark on the 
face of Europe, but in the longer perspective of history the division it created between 
an East and West needs to be differentiated. However getting entirely rid of the notion 
of an Eastern Europe is also fraught with difficulties. There is a sense in which as a con-
sequence of the developments that have occurred since 1990 that Eastern Europe should 
now be projected further to the east and refers to the western regions of the Russian 
speaking lands. In this view, Eastern Europe refers to Belarus, Kalingrad, Ukraine, and 
Moldova. 
The approach taken in this paper is to define the eastern component of Europe by 
a logic that configures the mental map in terms of East Central, South East and a North 
East. According to this reasoning, Eastern Europe is best seen in terms of three interrelated 
zones. Of these the latter is the more complicated one; instead of being termed Eastern 
Europe – or even “far eastern Europe” or some such formulation – the term North East-
ern Europe is the more accurate one. The area comprising it includes the Baltic Republics 
in addition to Kalingrad, Belarus, Ukraine, and possibly Moldova. While North Western 
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Europe would then extend inland into the vastness of Ukraine, as a region the area is 
centrally defined by its relation to the Baltic Sea which gives it its European character as 
a borderland area of interconnected cities.
These areas are clearly primarily influenced by Russia and were for a long time part 
of the Soviet Union [Szporluk 1991]. The three Baltic Republics, forcibly incorporated in 
1940, have always been part of the wider European area and cities such as Tallinn and Riga 
were important Hanseatic cities and where German was widely spoken. Unlike other parts 
of the region, they are also part of western Christianity, Lithuania being predominantly 
Catholic and also the most northern Catholic nation. Kaliningrad was the former German 
city and province of Königsberg in East Prussia. Moldavia, which was partially colonized 
by the Romans, was considerably influenced by Romania, the modern state of which was 
formed in part of western Moldova. In the case of Moldova, North Western Europe merges 
into South Western Europe.
Belarus and Ukraine are clearly only partially European and the latter does not entirely 
fit into the designation North Eastern, which as used in this paper is partly as an alterna-
tive to the notion Eastern Europe (which is perhaps a more pertinent in the case of the 
Ukraine). However, both have strong European civilizational influences. Polish influences 
in Ukraine and Belarus have been historically strong, and of course Lithuania was part of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom. Parts of Poland were incorporated into Belarus after 1945. 
Western Ukraine has traditionally been regarded as European and was the least Soviet area 
in the USSR [Szporluk 1991: 475]. Russian and Ukraine historiography has traditionally 
distinguished both Belarus and the Ukraine from the general course of Russian history and 
have emphasized its Europeanness [Halecki 1950: 137]. However, there can be little doubt 
that the Ukraine in general is more closely allied with Russia than with Europe, for Kiev 
was the common birthplace of both Russian and the Ukraine. The trajectory of Russian 
history begins with the Kiev Rus before the foundation of Muscovite state which became 
the successor of the Kievan kingdom. Due to the overlapping and entangled histories of the 
area, there is then a good case to include these countries in the mapping of the historical 
regions of Europe. 
In sum, in civilizational terms North Eastern Europe has been shaped by the Russian 
influence and to varying degrees by other civilizational currents. As a historical region it 
possibly has the weakest identity as a region, given the divisions of its history and the forc-
ible incorporation of its territories into the Soviet Union. The Baltic republics themselves 
do not have a clearly articulated collective identity as a region; each having quite different 
histories prior to their incorporation into the Soviet Republic. The model of modernity 
in the region has been equally fragmented, depending on the degree of Russification. 
Of the historical regions of Europe it is the one that, with the exception of the Baltic 
republics, had the weakest civil society tradition and where democratization developed 
only relatively lately and incompletely. Again, with the exception of the Baltic Republics, 
where the modern market society was relatively advanced prior to their incorporation 
into the Soviet Union, virtually all these countries experienced a very late transition to 
capitalism. As a result the model of modernity that evolved there was shaped more by 
a feudal legacy – a term to be sure that can be used only with some difficulty in the Rus-
sian context – left by German, Nordic and Russian conquerors, and the subsequent rise 
of Soviet totalitarianism. 
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Conclusion
The six historical regions discussed in this paper are historically variable and over-
lapping. They do not simply overlap with each other, but are also closely linked spatially 
and culturally with areas that lie outside the European region as a whole. The paper has 
stressed in this regard the formative influence of the east in the west, and the importance 
of the Russian and Ottoman-Islamic worlds in the making of Europe. This serves in part 
to correct the older eurocentric view of the making of Europe that tended to see Europe as 
shaped by itself and to define all its regions in terms of their relation to the North West. In 
approaching the question of the historical regions of Europe from such an inter-civilizati-
onal perspective, it may be possible to avoid an account that sees unity only as possible in 
face of a common enemy, for as we have seen there was neither one enemy that predomi-
nated nor was there a single core that gave to Europe its identity. To the extent to which it 
is possible to speak of the “idea of Europe”, this must be found in the plurality of its regions, 
which offer an alternative to accounts of European history in terms of national narratives. 
The emphasis on a plurality of regions with their own civilizational backgrounds and rou-
tes to modernity does not, it must be noted, mean that there is no unity since all these regi-
ons interacted with each other and ultimately such interaction made possible the genesis 
of modernity and the formation of Europe as a world historical region.
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